There is a set of incompatible patient-donor pairs and these pairs are matched pairwise.
when there are small groups of patients (Gentry et al. [8] ).
Given these characteristics of kidney exchange, the current practice includes a set of incompatible pairs registered for a paired kidney donation and a set of incompatible pairs registered for a listed exchange, and these two sets are treated separately. A simple idea is to combine these two sets to further utilize the donors, in accordance with the kidney exchange programs' current objective of maximizing the number of transplants. Based on this idea, we propose a model where there are two sets of pairs: (i) pairs with a patient expecting a transplantation only from a live donor (these belong to the pool of paired kidney donations) and (ii) pairs with a patient expecting either a transplantation from a live donor or an urgent transplantation from a deceased donor (these belong to the pool of listed exchanges). These (separately formed) pools of pairs are then reconsidered together and combined to further improve the utilization of the donors. The incompatible pairs are matched pairwise according to the medical compatibilities between them. There are two mutually exclusive paired exchanges when two pairs are matched:
It is either a paired kidney donation, where the pairs exchange the live donors, or a paired listed exchange, where the first patient receives a live donor kidney and the second pair receives a priority on the wait-list. The interpretation of a paired listed exchange is twofold. First, from an institutional perspective, there is no difference between a listed exchange and a paired listed exchange as far as the patients in the wait-list are concerned. Listed exchange replaces the top priority patient with another patient, thanks to a live donor (the donor of the second patient).
As far as the wait-list is concerned, the paired listed exchange does the same thing. For this reason, donation chains of large sizes are possible in practice and in a paired listed exchange, only two pairs take part. Second, the second pair in a paired listed exchange is already registered for a listed exchange and a paired listed exchange does not improve the welfare of the patient in that pair but it helps some other patient receiving a live donor kidney. Thus, while a pair joins the exchange pool with the expectation of getting a transplantation from a live donor; if this does not happen, ex post, paired listed exchange has a flavor of altruism: since the patient in the second pair would have received priority on the wait-list anyways by engaging in a listed exchange by itself, only the first pair benefits from this match. 8 Thus, while two patients benefit from a paired kidney donation, only one patient benefits from a paired listed exchange. Also, there is no issue of strategic manipulation: since we take the type of a patient as given by the current pool that he belongs to, there is no gaming among the pairs in the form of revealing whether to accept priority in the wait-list (in exchange for the donor donating to a patient on the wait-list) or to accept a transplantation only from a live donor. Thus, our approach to this matching problem excludes any type of strategic manipulation per se. We provide a characterization of the matchings with the maximum number of patients receiving a live donor kidney transplantation. Our result generalizes the well-known Gallai [6, 7] -Edmonds [5] Decomposition Theorem, which characterizes the maximum cardinality matchings for the problems where each pairwise match corresponds to a uniform weight.
For the constrained kidney exchange problem, in which only the paired kidney donations are allowed, an efficient and strategy-proof mechanism exists under the dichotomous preferences of the patients and the characterization of the efficient matchings (Roth et al. [19] ) is given by the Gallai [6, 7] -Edmonds [5] Decomposition Theorem. There exists also a stochastic mechanism motivated by the fairness considerations. The existence and characterization of the egalitarian matchings (Roth et al. [19] ) generalize the corresponding results on the two-sided matching problem (Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2] ) to the general matching problem motivated by the kidney exchange.
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A new approach is to incorporate compatible pairs into exchange (Sönmez andÜnver [25] ); the paired kidney donations between the incompatible pairs as well as between an incompat- 8 In any matching, any unmatched pair including a patient from the set of patients (ii), engages in a listed exchange, thus that patient receives priority in the wait-list as well. These type of unmatched pairs and the pairs matched via a paired listed exchange go to the top of the wait-list together. Since they were already registered for a listed exchange, there is a clear way of prioritizing these pairs. Moreover, although one might think that to be at the top or at the bottom of this short list of patients (who are lined up for a listed exchange) should make a big difference, actually it is not the case. Given the very long waiting times for a cadaveric kidney and that the number of these patients (up for listed exchange) is so small compared to the huge number of patients in the very long wait-list, the difference between being at the top and at the bottom is negligible.
9 Also, for a preference profile constructed according to the blood-type compatibilities, three-way kidney donations as well as paired kidney donations will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants and larger than three-way kidney donations have less impact Roth et al. [22] . ible pair and a compatible pair are considered. For this problem, the efficient matchings are characterized by extending the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem (Sönmez andÜnver [25] ). 10 In a related work, the matching rules are analyzed such that they provide incentives to patients with compatible donors to enroll in such programs by offering them the chance of receiving an organ with higher expected graft survival (Nicolò and Rodriguez-Álvarez [13] ).
For the unconstrained kidney exchange problem, the organization of kidney exchange (under the assumptions of dichotomous preferences of the patients on the live donor kidneys and that the success rates of transplants from live donors are higher than those from cadavers) is explored and the set of efficient and fair random matchings is characterized (Yılmaz [27] ). This model is essentially different than the current one in the sense that the former considers the setting where there is no restriction on the number of pairs included in an exchange. 11 Also, dynamically optimal kidney exchange mechanisms are characterized in a setting where patient-donor pool is evolving dynamically (Ünver [26] ).
The model
A pair consists of a patient and a donor such that the donor cannot medically donate her kidney to the patient of the pair. Let N be the set of all pairs. Given two pairs x, y ∈ N , if the donor of y can medically donate her kidney to the patient of x, we say that x is compatible with y. Given two pairs, if the donor of each pair can medically donate her kidney to the patient of the other pair, we say that these two pairs are mutually compatible. Each pair
x has the following preferences on N : it is indifferent between all compatible pairs, indifferent between all incompatible pairs and it strictly prefers a compatible pair to remaining unmatched and remaining unmatched to an incompatible pair.
A pair can be matched to another pair or remain unmatched. A paired kidney donation (PKD) involves two mutually compatible pairs x and y such that the patient of x receives the 10 This work is closest to the current one and we discuss it further in Section 4. 11 Roth et al. [18, 22] also analyze the unconstrained problem.
kidney of the donor of y and the patient of y receives the kidney of the donor of x. A paired listed exchange (PLE) involves two pairs x and y, such that x is compatible with y and y is not compatible with x, the patient of x receives the kidney of the donor of y, the donor of x donates to a patient in the wait-list, and the patient of y receives priority in the wait-list. Due to a medical fact, that a live donor kidney has a substantially higher patient survival and graft survival rates than the deceased donor kidney, each pair strictly prefers a compatible pair to a deceased donor kidney.
There are two types of pairs: a p-pair prefers being unmatched to a deceased donor kidney transplantation and an l-pair prefers the highest priority on the wait-list to being unmatched.
The sets of p-pairs and the l-pairs are denoted by N p and N l , respectively and they partition the set N .
A feasible exchange matrix R = [r x,y ] x,y∈N identifies all feasible exchanges where this by µ 1 (x) = y and if x and y are matched via a PKD, we denote this by µ 2 (x) = y. 12 For a 12 Whenever convenient and no confusion arises, we denote by µ also the set of pairs matched via the function µ. Since µ 1 and µ 2 correspond to the set of PLE's and PKD's, respectively, this notation implies µ = µ 1 ∪ µ 2 .
problem (N, R), let M(N, R) denote the set of all matchings.
Since any pair can always receive priority in the wait-list by simply accepting to be in a listed exchange, when comparing two different matchings, only the patients receiving a live donor kidney transplantation should be taken into consideration. For each matching µ, let T µ denote the set of all pairs who receive a transplant from a live donor. Formally,
and some x ∈ N strictly prefers µ(x) to µ (x). A matching µ ∈ M is Pareto efficient if no other matching Pareto dominates µ. For a problem (N, R), let E(N, R) denote the set of Pareto efficient matchings.
Maximum and p-maximum matchings
Our model relies on the interpretation of the sets N p and N l . There is a set of pairs N p , each of whom expects to receive a transplant from a live donor and there is a set of pairs N l , each of whom has accepted to be in a listed exchange to receive priority in the wait-list. These two sets are integrated to improve social welfare via the extended set of feasible PKD's and PLE's.
For example, let N p = {x} and N l = {y} such that r x,y = 1. If these two pairs are considered separately, then the pair x remains unmatched, and the pair y receives priority in the wait-list.
On the other hand, if these two sets are considered together as suggested in our model, then the pair x receives a transplant from the donor of y and the pair y receives priority in the wait-list.
When there are no l-pairs, a well-known result, the Gallai [6, 7] -Edmonds [5] Decomposition Theorem, 13 characterizes the structure of Pareto efficient matchings and the same number of Also, for a matching µ, (x, y) ∈ µ 2 means that the patient of each pair receives a kidney from the donor of the other pair and (x, y) ∈ µ 1 means that the patient of x receives a kidney from the donor of y, the donor of x donates to a patient on the wait-list, the patient of y receives priority in the wait-list, and y ∈ N l . Thus, for x = y, (x, y) ∈ µ 2 implies (y, x) ∈ µ 2 , and (x, y) ∈ µ 1 implies (y, x) ∈ µ 1 . 
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The existing exchange mechanism used in practice considers the pool of the p-pairs separately and matches the pairs in such a way that the number of transplants is maximized.
Focusing on the same objective, our approach considers the sets of the l-pairs and p-pairs together, which are originally formed separately. The l-pairs are located possibly in several regions which are geographically close to the location of the pool of the p-pairs. These l-pairs are then integrated to the pool of the p-pairs so that the number of transplants is further en-x is already registered for a listed exchange to receive priority in the wait-list, and after the integration, pair x will receive either a live donor kidney transplant (if (x, y) ∈ µ) or priority in the wait-list (if x is unmatched or (y, x) ∈ µ 1 , in either case x is back in a (paired) listed exchange). The question is whether the welfare of the p-pairs (weakly) improves as well, in other words, whether the l-pairs do not have a negative externality on the welfare of the p-pairs, if the transplantation center insists on the p-maximum matchings. More specifically, suppose a maximum (equivalently, p-maximum in this particular setting of only p-pairs) matching is fixed for the set of p-pairs only. Let T be the set of pairs who receive a transplant in this matching. Then, after the integration of the l-pairs to the pool of p-pairs, does there exist a p-maximum matching in this new problem, so that all the patients in T receive a live donor kidney transplant? As our first result shows, the answer is positive.
This result implies that the efficiency gains from the integration of the l-pairs to the pool of p-pairs are always at the full level, even if the set of matchings is restricted so that each pair in a subset of N p is guaranteed to receive a live donor kidney transplant. 17 Thus, given a priority ordering on N p and a priority mechanism based on this ordering 18 , a p-maximum matching can be obtained under the integration without making a pair in N p worse off with respect to the outcome of this priority mechanism.
The structure of p-maximum matchings
Given the sets N p and N l , our goal is to characterize the structure of p-maximum matchings.
As discussed in the introduction, there is no room for strategic manipulation because our model relies on the fact that the types of the patients are already revealed and the sets N p and N l are known and they are combined together to further improve the utilization of the donors. Thus, we focus only on the efficiency issues. For each problem (N, R), let
Let A 1 (N, R) be the set of pairs who are part of only PLE's in each p-maximum matching and have a compatibility with at least one pair in D(N, R).
A component C of N ⊆ N is such that (i) for each x ∈ C and y ∈ N \ C, x is not compatible with y and y is not compatible with x, (ii) for each C C, there exist u ∈ C and v ∈ N \ C such that either u is compatible with v or v is compatible with u.
Theorem 1 Let (N, R) be a problem. Then, 1. in any p-maximum matching, each pair in A 1 (N, R) is matched to a pair in D(N, R);
(a) for each x ∈ C, the problem (C \ {x}, R| C\{x} ) has a matching with each pair being matched, (b) in any p-maximum matching, each pair in C but one is matched to a pair in C, (c) in any p-maximum matching, at most one pair in C is matched to a pair in N \ C and such a pair, if any, is matched to a pair in A 1 (N, R).
To illustrate the idea and the sets D(N, R) and A 1 (N, R), we provide a simple example.
Example 2: Let N p = {u, v}, N l = {x, y, z} and the feasible exchange matrix R be as follows: In any p-maximum matching, three patients receive a transplantation from a live donor; also, z is matched to either u or y via a PKD, and x is matched to either u, y or v via a PLE. There are four such p-maximum matchings, each of which is such that one of the pairs u, v and y is unmatched. Thus, D(N, R) = {u, v, y} and A 1 (N, R) = {x}.
Our result conveys the following: For our general model of kidney exchange, while the
Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition (GED)
19 structure is not fully present anymore, a restricted GED-type structure with a similar economic interpretation (as in the pairwise kidney exchange with only PKD's) still exists. There exists a set of pairs each of which will always engage in a PLE with a pair from another given set; also, if a subset of the former set corresponds to a particular component structure in the reduced problem, then the structure of matchings of the pairs in that component is equivalent to the one implied by the GED-type structure.
Our result extends the GED Theorem: given (N, R), when no two pairs are mutually compatible, thus, when for all x, y ∈ N , r x,y ∈ {0, 1}, the structure given in Theorem 1 reduces to the GED Theorem; we discuss further how the latter theorem derives from our result in which illustrate that there is no further GED-type structure than the one given in Theorem 1.
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A similar (and independent) result is obtained by Sönmez andÜnver [25] via an altruistic kidney exchange model introduced by the authors; their model includes the compatible pairs in a way that the PKD's occur between the incompatible pairs or between an incompatible pair and a compatible pair. This can be interpreted as a particular case of our model: Each compatible pair can be matched only with an incompatible pair and if it is matched, it benefits the incompatible pair that it is matched but not itself, because its patient is compatible with its donor and would receive her kidney anyways. Thus, the compatible pair accepts to be matched with an incompatible pair purely for altruistic reasons. Thus, in such a match, only the patient of the incompatible pair benefits. Thus, N l is the set of compatible pairs in this model. However, there is a restriction: no two compatible pairs can be matched. Thus,
x, y ∈ N l implies r x,y = 0. 21 For this particular class of problems, the GED-type structure is fully preserved. Thus, our result shows the extent to which the GED structure is maintained under a generalization of the altruistic kidney exchange model. 
Appendix

Preliminaries on graphs
Our goal is to characterize the set of p-maximum matchings, thus we focus on the number of patients receiving a transplant from a live donor. This implies that we can represent a kidney exchange problem by a weighted graph, where certain edges stand for a feasible PKD and others for a feasible PLE. We introduce below some basic notions in graph theory to be used in converting a feasible exchange matrix into a graph.
A problem (N, R) can be represented by a weighted graph G = (V, E, w), where V is the 20 These examples are available upon request. 21 Note that in the general model that we consider, there is no such restriction for the l-pairs: an l-pair can be compatible with another l-pair, also two l-pairs can be mutually compatible. 22 Another related result, which also builds on the GED Theorem, is related to fractional matchings. We discuss this extension and its relation to our work in Section 5.3. 
Proofs
First, we extend Theorem 2 to the graphs consisting of both thick and thin edges. Let ⊕ denote the symmetric difference operator, for E ,
Lemma 1 A matching µ in a graph G is p-maximum if and only if |µ 2 | = ν(G 2 ) and there does not exist a µ−augmenting path P with E 2 (P ∩ µ) = E 2 (P \ µ).
Proof. (Only if) Clearly, |µ 2 | ≤ ν(G 2 ). Suppose the inequality is strict. Then, by Theorem 2,
there is a µ 2 −augmenting path in G 2 , say P . If both of the end vertices in P are free in µ, then w(µ ⊕ P ) = w(µ) + 2, which contradicts µ having the maximum weight, thus being p-maximum. Suppose only one of the end vertices, say u, is covered in µ, say ux ∈ µ. Since P is a µ 2 −augmenting path in G 2 , the edge ux is thin. Then, w(µ ⊕ (P ∪ {ux})) = w(µ) + 1, which contradicts µ having the maximum weight, thus being p-maximum. Suppose both end vertices in P , say u and v, are covered by the (thin) edges in G, say by ux and vy. Then, w(µ ⊕ (P ∪ {ux, vy})) = w(µ) and the matching µ ⊕ (P ∪ {ux, vy}) has one more thick edge than the matching µ, which contradicts that µ is p-maximum. Thus, |µ 2 | = ν(G 2 ). Now, suppose there exists a µ−augmenting path P such that E 2 (P ∩ µ) = E 2 (P \ µ). Since the end vertices of the path P are free, the set P ⊕ µ is another matching. Moreover, we have
, where the first equality is by definition of the symmetric difference set, the second by the assumption and the third by the fact that the end vertices of P are free. Thus, both µ and P ⊕ µ have equal number of thick edges. Since the matching P ⊕ µ contains one more edge than µ and both µ and P ⊕ µ have equal number of thick edges, w(P ⊕ µ) = w(µ) + 1, which contradicts the matching µ having the maximum weight.
(If) Suppose µ is a non-maximum weight matching with |µ 2 | = ν(G 2 ). Let µ be a p-maximum matching. Since, in a matching, no two edges meet at a common vertex, each vertex is incident with at most one vertex in µ and one vertex in µ . Thus, the set µ ⊕ µ contains connected components of the form of either a µ−alternating path or a µ−alternating cycle. Since w(µ ) > w(µ), one of these alternating paths or cycles, say H, is such that w(H ∩ µ ) > w(H ∩ µ).
Suppose there exists such an alternating path, say P . Since µ contains the maximum possible number of thick edges, E 2 (P ∩ µ) ≥ E 2 (P ∩ µ ). Otherwise, µ ⊕ P contains more thick edges than µ, which is a contradiction. Now, since P is an alternating path, the difference between the number of edges of P ∩ µ and P ∩ µ can be at most one. Suppose |P ∩ µ | = |P ∩ µ| or
Thus, P is such that |P ∩ µ | = |P ∩ µ| + 1 and E 2 (P ∩ µ) = E 2 (P ∩ µ ). Note that this implies that P is a µ−augmenting path with E 2 (P ∩ µ) = E 2 (P \ µ). Now, suppose there exists an alternating cycle, say C, such that w(C ∩ µ ) > w(C ∩ µ). Since each vertex is incident to at most one vertex in µ and one vertex in µ , the cycle C is an even size cycle. But, since
, this is impossible.
PROOF of PROPOSITION 1:
Since x is covered by µ but not by µ , the set µ ⊕ µ contains a path P starting at x. Let P = {xx 1 , x 1 x 2 , . . . , x k−1 x k , x k y} be this path.
Observe that since µ is a matching for the problem (N p , R| Np ) and all the vertices x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k are covered by µ and µ , these vertices are in N p . Moreover, according to the definition of R, r a,b = 1 implies that b ∈ N l . Thus, all the edges x 1 x 2 , x 2 x 3 , . . . , x k−1 x k in P are thick. If y is covered by µ, then P is a µ −augmenting path: the matching P ⊕ µ contains more thick edges and has a higher weight than µ , contradicting that µ is p-maximum. Thus, y is not covered by µ but covered by µ . Thus, the path P contains even number of edges. If the edge x k y is thin, then, since all other edges in P are thick, the matching P ⊕ µ has a weight equal w(µ ) + 1, which contradicts that µ is p-maximum. Thus, the edge x k y is thick, and the matching P ⊕ µ is p-maximum as well. Observe that the matching P ⊕ µ covers all the vertices x, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k , but not y. Since y is not covered by µ, we obtained a p-maximum matching P ⊕ µ such that
By applying the same argument recursively, a p-maximum matching is obtained, where it covers all the vertices in T µ .
PROOF of THEOREM 1:
Let D 1 (N, R) and D 2 (N, R) be the sets of pairs who are in D(N, R) and part of only PLE's and of only PKD's, respectively, in any p-maximum matching.
be the set of pairs who are part of only PLE's in each p-maximum matching, which are not in A 1 (N, R).
, xy ∈ µ 1 for some y}. Let C 1,2 (N, R) be the set of pairs who are part of a PLE in some p-maximum matchings and part of a PKD in the remaining p-maximum matchings, who are not in A 1,2 (N, R).
A problem (N, R) can be represented by a graph G, as explained in Section 5.1, and in what follows, we refer to its graph representation rather than to the problem (N, R) itself. Moreover, the sets D(N, R) and A 1 (N, R) in Section 4, as well as the sets given in the previous paragraph in this subsection, can be redefined with the argument G instead of the argument (N, R), where the words "pair", "PLE" and "PKD" are replaced by "vertex", "thin edge" and "thick edge",
respectively. Thus, for example, we use D(G) instead of D(N, R).
Lemma 2 If u ∈ D 1 (G), then each edge incident with u in G is thin.
Proof. Let u ∈ D 1 (G). Suppose there exists a thick edge uv in G. Since u ∈ V (G 2 ), either
. Suppose the latter holds; that is, u is matched in any maximum matching in G 2 . By Lemma 1, each p-maximum matching µ in G is such that
. Thus, u is matched in any p-maximum matching via a thick edge in G, which
. Let M be a p-maximum matching missing u. The vertex v must be covered in M , otherwise M ∪ {uv} is also a matching with a higher weight than M , which contradicts M being a p-maximum matching. Let vw ∈ M . If vw is thin, then (M \ {vw}) ∪ {uv} has a higher weight than M , which contradicts M being p-maximum.
Thus, vw is thick. Then, clearly (M \ {vw}) ∪ {uv} is another p-maximum matching. But this Suppose P ends with an edge of M . Then, since M is in G − u, the path P does not cover u. If
contradicting that M is p-maximum; similarly, if w(P ∩ M ) > w(P ∩ M ), then it contradicts that M is p-maximum. Thus, w(P ∩ M ) = w(P ∩ M ). This, together with the fact that P is an even-length alternating path, implies that P ∩ M contains the same number of thick edges as P ∩ M . But then M ⊕ P is another p-maximum matching in G, which misses v. Thus,
Suppose P ends with an edge of M . We claim P ends at u. Suppose not. Then, if w(
Then, since P ∩ M contains more edges than
, contradicting that M is p-maximum. Thus, P ends at u. Now, consider
x be the vertex such that ux ∈ M . Note that, since u ∈ A 1 (G), w(ux) = w(uv ) = 1. Define
then, P ⊕ M is a matching in G − u, and moreover w(P ⊕ M ) > w(M ), contradicting that M is p-maximum. Thus, w(P \ M ) = w(P ∩ M ). But then, M ⊕ P is a matching in G.
Moreover, since P is an even-length path and w(M ⊕ P ) = w(M ), the matchings M ⊕ P and M have the same number of thick edges. Thus, M ⊕ P is a p-maximum matching in G.
(ii) First, we show that
, where the first inclusion follows from the definition of the sets D 1 (G − u) and D(G − u), the second inclusion by part (i). Thus, v ∈ D(G). Suppose that there exists a p-maximum matching in G, which covers v by a thick edge. Since u ∈ A 1 (G), this p-maximum matching does not contain uv. By removing the edge that covers u, a p-maximum matching in G − u is obtained, which covers v by a thick edge. But, since v ∈ D 1 (G − u), it is a contradiction. Thus,
Lemma 4 Let G be any graph. Let u ∈ A 1 (G). Then, 
. Thus, Lemma 3(ii) (together with the fact that the Also, since the matching M − u misses x, and the path ends with an edge of M − u, the path P does not cover the vertex x. But then, the matching (M − u) ⊕ P is a p-maximum matching in G − u, which covers v by a thin edge. Since this last matching does not cover the vertices u and x, the matching M ⊕ P is a p-maximum matching in G and it covers v by a thin edge as well. Thus, v ∈ D 1,2 (G).
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( 
in D(G).
Proof. Let u ∈ A 1 (G) and M be a p-maximum matching. Suppose M contains uv where v ∈ A 1 (G). Since u ∈ A 1 (G), the matching M \ {uv} is p-maximum in G − u. By Lemma 5, v ∈ A 1 (G − u). But, this contradicts that M \ {uv} is p-maximum and misses v in G − u.
be a vertex incident with u. The matching M covers v , since otherwise, (M \ {uv}) ∪ {uv } is p-maximum in G and misses v,
exists a p-maximum matching missing v . Let M be such a matching. The set M ⊕M contains alternating paths and cycles. Since v is covered by M and missed by M , M ⊕ M contains an alternating path, P , starting at v . By Lemma 1, that M and M are p-maximum implies that P is not an augmenting path. Thus, the matchings M ⊕ P and M ⊕ P are p-maximum in G.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: The path P does not contain uv. Then, the matching M ⊕P contains uv and misses the vertex v . But then, since both uv and uv are thin edges, the matching ((M ⊕P )\{uv})∪{uv } is p-maximum and missing v, which contradicts
Case 2: The path P contains uv. Then, the matching M ⊕ P is p-maximum and contains uv.
Since u ∈ A 1 (G), the matching M \ {uv} is p-maximum in G − u. Also, it misses v. Thus,
The last lemma completes the proof of part 1 of Theorem 1. The second part of the theorem relies on a trivial extension of the Gallai's Lemma (Lovász and Plummer [10] ); for the sake of completeness, we present the proof of this extension below. Since M misses u, the set M ⊕ M contains a path P starting at u with an edge of M .
Since both M and M are p-maximum, Lemma 1 implies that the path P is even. Also, since |A \ B| < |B \ A|, without loss of generality, we can assume that P does not end in A. Note that P does not contain any vertex of A. Then, by Lemma 1, M ⊕ P is p-maximum and misses the vertices in A ∪ {u}. Thus, there exists a p-maximum matching which misses A and at least one vertex of B \ A. Now define the binary relation ∼ as follows: u ∼ v if and only if u = v or no p-maximum matching misses both u and v. Suppose u ∼ v and v ∼ w. Let M be a p-maximum matching missing v and M missing u and w. But then, there is a p-maximum matching missing v and w, which is a contradiction. Thus, u ∼ w and ∼ is an equivalence relation. Now, since H is connected, any two vertices of H must be equivalent. Thus, any p-maximum matching misses at most one vertex of H. Also, since any vertex u ∈ H is also in
. Thus, the reduced submatching of M on H is a near-perfect matching of H.
Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph. 25 The Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition partitions V into three sets: D(G) is the set of all vertices v such that there is some maximum matching that leaves v unmatched, A(G) is the neighbor set of D(G), and C(G) is the set of all remaining vertices.
consists of odd components of G − A(G) such that each such component is hypomatchable and 25 Note that this is a particular case of the graph introduced in the Subsection 5.1; while the subsections 5.1 and 5.2 are on a particular class of weighted graphs, here we focus on non-weighted graphs (i.e. each edge has weight one). This implies that the definition of p-maximum matching becomes vacuous; thus in what follows, we refer to maximum (cardinality) matchings rather than p-maximum matchings. For the definition of a p-maximum or maximum (cardinality) matching, please see Section 3. 
Fractional matchings
Another extension of the GED Theorem is in the context of fractional matchings: Given a graph G = (V, E), a fractional matching is an assignment of the values 0, 1 2 , 1 to the edges E in such a way that for each vertex, the sum of the values on the incident edges is at most 1 26 Note that this does not hold in our model in general.
(Mühlbacher et al. [11] , Pulleyblank [14] form vertex-disjoint odd cycles. A basic fractional matching is called a U-matching if it is a maximum fractional matching for which the number of edges in the odd cycles is minimum. The characterization of the U-matchings is derived from the GED Theorem (Pulleybank [14] ). Seemingly, this model of fractional matchings has similarities to our model of kidney exchange, but it is essentially different and our main result (Theorem 1) is independent from the characterization of the U-matchings (Theorem 4, Pulleybank [14] .)
There are two main differences: first, our model relies on the non-homogeneous weights of the edges as opposed to the uniform edges; second, in a fractional matching, there can be two edges which are incident with the same vertex, whereas in our model, a matching is a subset of the edges such that no two edges meet at a common vertex. Due to these differences, the two characterization results are quite separate from each other. While the characterization of the U-matchings is built on the partition of the GED Decomposition, i.e. on the partition of V into the sets D(G), A(G) and C(G), the characterization of the p-matchings in our model is obtained via a completely different partition of the set V . Actually, the structure of the U-matchings coincides with the parts (i) and (ii) of the GED Theorem. The only difference from the GED Theorem is that a U-matching may induce a perfect fractional matching for some odd component of G − A(G), which means that in this U-matching, there is an odd cycle such that each of its edges has value 1 2 . (Theorem 4, Pulleybank [14] ). On the other hand, our main result gives a different and more restricted structure on a more complex partition of V , yet this characterization is rich enough to include the GED structure as a special case.
